


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NWC-352.13

3 November 1958

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Reference is made to your lecture, "Intelligence Matters and National Security Policy," delivered at The National War College on 27 October 1958.

Enclosed is the stenotypist's transcription of this lecture in duplicate. We would like to make a final copy of this lecture for our library but to be sure we have made no major errors would you please look this over and return to us the original transcription. The carbon copy is for your retention.

Please feel free to make such changes as you desire on the transcription. Unless the space is insufficient your notations may be made directly on this copy.

Again, I would like to express our appreciation and thanks for this very fine presentation.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

JOHN W. KEATING  
Colonel, Infantry  
Executive Officer

Encl - 1

Lecture in duplicate

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

By

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

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Presented at  
The National War College  
Washington, D. C.  
27 October 1953

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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND  
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

By

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

(27 October 1958)

MR. CHAPIN: (Introduced the speaker).

MR. DULLES: Ambassador Chapin, General Mundy, Admiral Ammon, gentlemen:-

I did not realize you kept ~~such~~ careful track ~~of~~ <sup>such in a</sup> of the number of times that I have come here. It is, in fact, my eighth visit to you. I always enjoy these chances to be with both Colleges. I find it as inspiring an audience as I ever speak before, properly critical but generally pretty friendly. I do not mean by that <sup>that</sup> I want any of you, when I get through, to pull any of your punches insofar as the questions are concerned, because I like sharp controversial questions much better than the easy ones.

It was just over ten years ago that the CIA was organized under the National Security Act of 1947. And the subject that you have given me this morning, namely, the national intelligence function and how it influences the formulation of national security policy, gives me an opportunity to review some of our problems <sup>and</sup> some of the experience we have in developing the national intelligence function to which Ambassador Chapin has just referred. I think he is correct in saying that we have achieved to some extent the getting of national security intelligence into the main stream of policy formulation. Our problem now is to make that stream stronger and more effective.

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The concept of the coordination of national security intelligence really goes back to the Act of 1947. It was drawn up by some very wise men in the Congress -- Congressman Wadsworth was one of the leaders of that group -- and others. They gave a great deal of thought, time and attention to it, and they produced an act which has been so good that in the eight years I have been with the agency I have not suggested any major changes to that act, although I have been invited to do so by <sup>various committees of</sup> the Congress from time to time. ~~and by various committees~~ <sup>The Act</sup> was wisely general in its terms <sup>and</sup> broad in its scope.

First of all, it gave to me, as Director of Central Intelligence, working through the Intelligence Community, to which I will refer later, the right to advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters relating to national security. It also gave me the right to recommend to the National Security Council measures to coordinate our national security intelligence. It provided for the correlation and evaluation and dissemination of national security intelligence; and then it finally, in the last two operative paragraphs of the Act, recognizing that one could not legislate an intelligence system or properly provide for all of the functions that such a system should have, said that the Central Intelligence Agency should <sup>such</sup> perform ~~functions~~ of common concern in the general intelligence field as might be from time to time prescribed to it by the National Security Council. ~~Acting~~ Acting under that authority in the law, the National Security Council has from time to time ~~through National~~

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*in the intelligence field proper was concerned.*

Security Council intelligence directives, where the intelligence field proper was concerned; in effect legislated our charter. ~~and then~~ In certain other fields relating very largely to actions to thwart the Communist subversive effort it has given certain particular functions to the Central Intelligence Agency.

I will not deal with those latter today, as it is not really within the scope of the subject that has been given me. I will deal, therefore, only with the intelligence function that the agency has.

Now, I want to make clear that the agency has not set up any monopoly. I am no czar. I have broad powers in the field of coordination. I have no powers in the field of usurpation. And I propose to leave to the State Department in its field, <sup>and</sup> to the Services in their fields, the very large role in intelligence which they have and as of right should exercise.

As to the importance of what we call national security intelligence, that is, broad intelligence relating to national security policy, I want now ~~just a minute~~ to delve into the field of history <sup>for just a minute to</sup> point out how the course of history has been changed because of the failure of the leaders of great countries properly to appraise the situation with which they were faced. And here I am not talking about details of the situation but the broad elements opposing them. I go back to the days before World War I for my first example. There are many other examples. One can go back as far as history is concerned and produce other examples, and it might be interesting some day to do that.

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You may recall in the days just before the outbreak of the war in 1914 (in ~~September~~<sup>August</sup>) when Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor of Germany, then risked the fate of his country on the gamble that Great Britain would not fight for what he called "a scrap of paper", namely, the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium. There was a clear case of failure to ~~properly~~ appraise the English character, to ~~properly~~ appraise the elements (the world power elements) of a critical situation. Whether he would have gone to war irrespective of ~~British action~~ <sup>British action</sup> of that, I cannot say, but certainly he was caught by surprise on a basic and important facet of his policy.

Then, turning to World War II, if you look over the documents which were discovered after the war, including the reports of Hitler's meetings with his Generals just before embarking on World War II, in one dramatic moment when he was describing the campaign that he proposed to initiate he described England and France as "little worms" and said, "I saw them at Munich". Well, this was hardly an appropriate description of Winston Churchill.

We can find in our own history, ~~similar cases~~ <sup>similar cases</sup> maybe intelligence itself partly ~~in the one~~ was at fault ~~because~~ if we go back to the attack up to the Yalu River toward the end of 1950, <sup>but in any case the US acted in the best</sup> One could debate whether there was a failure of intelligence or a failure of calculation ~~but certainly at~~ <sup>in 1950</sup> at the time the attack was made in the advance to the Yalu River, it was not believed by the high command that the Chinese would attack in force.

That raises one of the most difficult problems that we have

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to deal with in the field of national intelligence, the difference between capability and intent. In the case of the Yalu attack the capabilities of the enemy were well known and were appropriately dealt with by the Intelligence Community; that is to say, it was well known that the Chinese Communists had many hundred thousands of troops the other side of the Yalu and if they decided to enter into the combat with force they could throw an overpowering weight of attack into that situation.

On the question of intent, which in every estimate, of course, is an essential part, the situation was not clear; this was in the days when the estimate <sup>ive</sup> process insofar as our Intelligence Community was concerned was at its very beginning. An estimate was made at that time of that situation. It was not bad; it was not very good; it was about half and half. In fact, in one article it was cited ~~badly~~ by former President Truman on one side of the case and it was cited by General MacArthur in another article on exactly the opposite side. That is the kind of an estimate I am trying to get away from. I do not say that either of the citations was correct, ~~I think one can make a better case of the estimate than was made, but~~ but ~~from~~ I just cite ~~that~~ as an example.

Now, we are trying as far as possible to say something definite or at least to give the chances. In a case like the Yalu case, I do not know, looking back on it, that one could have come out with the right answer. I think there would have always been a shade of a good many differences of opinion. In that event we try to see that

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our estimates bring out both sides of the case -- the arguments on both sides -- and try to weigh them and try to come out with what are the probabilities in a situation of that kind.

Those are historical instances of failure of proper appraisal. There have been cases, I believe, where there has been failure to get intelligence promptly to the proper quarters, or failure, when the intelligence got there, to get it to be believed and acted upon by the proper quarters. Pearl Harbor is a case in point.

I think there was plenty of intelligence at the time of Pearl Harbor to have pinpointed the likelihood of an attack. I think now we have a dissemination machinery and an action machinery in the intelligence field which should at least see to it that intelligence of that nature gets to the proper quarters with the proper impact at the proper time. If we haven't, we fail to do one of the most important things that I have tried to do in the last eight years that I have been here in Washington.

Another instance, <sup>was</sup> the Anglo-American landing in North Africa in November of 1942. I have what I think is adequate evidence that Hitler was told that that was going to take place and was given pretty good intelligence on it. He said: "They haven't got the ships; they can't do it; forget it." And he did forget it, with the consequences that you know.

How are we organizing to meet such problems as these? As I say, you could multiply the few instances that I have given by

many, many times.

We have, first of all, the estimate ~~function~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~are pre-~~  
~~responsible for~~ ~~passing~~ <sup>in</sup> the new top intelligence board, created by a merger of the  
two existing boards a few weeks ago ~~- we now have~~ <sup>I t is called</sup> the United States  
Intelligence Board.

<sup>14</sup>  
The United States Intelligence Board includes the senior intelligence officials of the Department of State, of the military ~~and representatives of~~ <sup>and</sup> Services, ~~it includes~~ the Department of Defense, ~~it includes~~ the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ~~representatives~~, <sup>It</sup> includes the Atomic Energy Commission, and it includes the FBI for matters where external security and internal security mesh. I am Chairman of that Board and we meet at least once a week. ~~in~~ In days of crises such as we have been going through recently we are likely to be meeting much more frequently than that.

In ~~the~~ <sup>these</sup> meetings we consider and pass on national estimates. Those are appraisals of a given situation. They may be appraisals of a trend in a particular country. We are now working on our major paper which is dealing with the likely trends in the Communist Bloc over the next five years. We are ~~now~~ working on a paper to bring up to date our estimate on guided missiles. We have recently drawn up some papers on our estimate ~~on~~ <sup>of</sup> the Soviet bomber situation. They are political, military and scientific and cover the field of important intelligence on the outside world, particularly on the Communist Bloc.

These estimates are either drawn according to a schedule which we have projected ahead of time, or as circumstances demand, or

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as policy papers come up before the National Security Council. If there is a policy paper coming up on, let us say, Iran, where Ambassador Chapin worked so hard and so effectively, we will prepare for the National Security Council and for the Planning Board, which draws up the paper for the National Security Council, an estimate ~~on~~ <sup>of</sup> the likely developments in the Iranian situation as we see them.

Normally these papers are prepared in this way:- A subject is selected. Depending upon the nature of the subject, whether it is political, scientific or technical, or in the field of missiles, we seek contributions from the agency or agencies particularly concerned. Those contributions go to the Board of National Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency, which then works up a first draft of a paper. Sometimes the ~~paper~~ <sup>contribution</sup> would be prepared by one of the sub-committees of the United States Intelligence Board. For example, we have subcommittees on atomic energy matters, on guided missile matters, on economic matters, and on a good many other matters. Then the representatives of the various intelligence agencies below the top ~~with the Board of National Estimates~~ level meet <sup>and</sup> finalize a draft estimate for the Intelligence Board; then the Intelligence Board meets and finalizes the paper. Very often if we find serious differences of view or find inadequacies in the paper we send it back for review by the various agencies.

Now, I grant that this is a somewhat long process. Some of the very large papers on the Soviet Union may take several months. But we are also prepared to draw up a paper within a day, if necessary, and we have had to do that on a good many occasions -- in recent days in

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connection with the crises in the Middle East and the Taiwan Strait. Just about two years ago now I recall I went off to vote; I was on my way to vote when I was called back to prepare (working all night) an estimate as to the Suez situation when Bulganin threatened to send guided ~~ballistic~~ missiles to London and Paris and elsewhere. We were called together and in a matter of a few hours prepared for the President for the next morning our estimate as to the likelihood of such action and what the Soviet intervention in the matter importend.

I have said before that in drawing up these final estimates we do not fight for unanimity at all costs. We like to get agreement if agreement can be obtained. If agreement cannot be obtained, if I see what is a clear-cut difference of views, I much prefer to see those different views clearly presented to the policy makers so that they will know that there is a difference. I have to assume responsibility for the paper myself. I never yet have declined to put in, in the form desired by the particular agency, the dissent to any section of the national estimate to which that particular agency wanted to dissent. I would say that on some part, oh, about half our papers, there is a dissent. A great many of the papers are unanimous; but on certain sections of a complicated paper -- let's say on the paper with regard to the Soviet Union -- there will obviously be here and there some dissents to our over-all conclusions. That is the way national estimates are prepared.

Now, in addition to that machinery, we have set up what I might call the early warning function machinery. That is machinery

which will alert the Intelligence Community to anything that seems to indicate the danger of attack by the Communist Bloc. We have kept it fairly narrow. We have not given this committee the duty of looking into every South American revolution or every change in government in Iraq, in Burma, so forth and so on. We want them to keep their eyes focused on the main issue, which is, of course, the threat of attack from the Communist Bloc. Added to that, of course, is the Taiwan Strait situation as falling within their functions.

The Watch Committee has very largely the same personnel as the Intelligence Board -- the Service intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Watch Committee, which meets in the Pentagon on a weekly basis, makes its report to the Intelligence Board and if we approve it, it is circulated as an approved paper of the Intelligence Community.

Then we have on a 24-hour basis an Indications Center in the Pentagon to which all intelligence relating to the possibility of hostilities or preparing for hostilities by the Soviet Union goes.

~~it would also get collateral intelligence that might bear on that general subject. That meets on a 24-hour bases, and If it obtains~~ <sup>The Indications Center</sup>  
any information of an urgent character it immediately passes that on to the Watch Committee for its consideration and possible action. My deputy, General Cabell, is the Chairman of the Watch Committee.

Of course, in connection with this work we have drawn up lists of indices of possible difficulties. We have taken all past crises, analyzed the various indices that might have led us to

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anticipate these crises, and those are being all the time studied and perfected by the Indication Center, ~~which also sits in the Pentagon.~~

One of our great problems has been getting intelligence back quickly enough. We have now developed what we call the "critic system". Any telegrams labeled with this particular indicator are given absolute priority over the cable wires or radio so as to get

back to the United States and to the disseminating office as quickly

~~Once it is in the US it is given immediate as possible, and from the disseminating office or from the originating office it may come in through NSA (the National Security Agency), regardless of the channel by which it may have arrived in Washington.~~  
It very likely would come in through NSA; it might come in through us; it might come in through any one of the offices in the Pentagon or the State Department.

There is a machinery set up under this "critic" system whereby those messages are given extremely rapid communication to all the ~~other~~ elements of the Intelligence Community. We have now before the Bureau of the Budget a rather expansive system ~~at least they think it is expansive, a little too expansive~~ for mechanizing the transmission of critic intelligence from various centers, such as,

for example  and various other parts of

the world, so that information funnelled into there then is automatically transmitted further. But we have gotten the time for

critical messages down from hours to minutes already. ~~and I think~~

~~we are making pretty good progress on that.~~ <sup>the rapid handling of intelligence</sup>

We have taken account in the Intelligence Community that scientific intelligence has now become probably in many ways the

most vital intelligence that we have to collect short of early warning intelligence, and the two are mixed together in many instances.

What is the progress that the Russians are making in guided missiles? That is of vital importance to our national security. It has become the issue in a rather warm Congressional debate that took place just before the adjournment this last year. The Russians have not been testing as many long-range guided missiles as we would have expected them to have tested in this particular period following certain testings last fall. Why is that? Were those testings so successful they felt they did not need any more for their first family of long-range missiles? Did they find there were some bugs in the earlier ones that they wanted to eliminate before testing? Those are very vital questions that are under careful consideration at the present time.

Of course, our work in the nuclear field is of vital importance. Now we are getting more and more evidence with regard to their last rather hectic tests prior to the possible termination of testing on the 31st of this month.

We are studying very carefully the question of what they are doing with regard to high performance long-range bombers. That is one of the great question marks in the intelligence field. They seem to have cut down ~~somewhat~~ on their production of the BISON. Why is that? Was that an unsatisfactory plane? Or have they found a new model that they prefer? Are they likely to come out with a high performance supersonic model of a jet bomber? All those are questions

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that are the subject of our whole estimative process.

There is one related issue that has given me a good deal of worry over the years, and I think now we have helped to plug what seemed to me to be a gap in the intelligence field. We intelligence officers are not supposed to be and are not at all experts on where we, the United States, stand in a particular field, whether it be guided missiles, aircraft, and so forth. That is not our business. It is our business to try to report where the U.S.S.R. and its allies stand in these various fields.

I always felt there was somewhat a gap in not drawing certain comparisons so that we could say, "Well, look here, we are doing fairly well here; we are keeping the lead on them here", or, in another field maybe, "They are pushing ahead pretty fast here and we had better watch out". So there has now been established adequate machinery for drawing what I call comparative appraisals. That would be taking what we believe to be the Russian situation in a given field (and that would not necessarily and solely be the guided missiles or aircraft; it might be in any field relating to the military effort) And then getting in experts on our own position and ~~them~~ drawing what might be called a comparative appraisal on relative positions so <sup>that</sup> one could see where it might be necessary to put greater emphasis and where the situation may prove to be relatively satisfactory.

In the last half hour I have been giving you pretty largely the question of how we prepare our intelligence appraisals. Now I want to turn to another side of the picture.

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How do we get the intelligence to the users?

As history has shown and as you know well, it is no use drawing up beautiful pieces of paper, no matter how correct they may be; if nobody uses them, nobody reads them, they have no impact on policy. We have adopted a series of methods for ~~solving this~~. ~~meeting this problem~~ ~~one doesn't~~ what I might call three types of intelligence ~~are involved~~.

There is spot intelligence that rolls off the wires day by day of a relatively overt nature but which requires prompt consideration and prompt analysis.

There is secret intelligence of that same nature which comes in from agent sources or from other sources that are not necessarily at first glance acceptable as authoritative but which still cannot be disregarded.

And then there is the third type of intelligence, that which I have been discussing as the finished intelligence, the estimate.

Now, for the spot intelligence that comes in, we in CIA circulate daily, except Sundays -- we have special bulletins on Sundays when necessary -- a bulletin which contains on an all-source basis all the ~~intelligence~~ <sup>important</sup> intelligence which has come in over the 24 hours prior to the preparation of that bulletin. That includes intelligence that has come in through State, through all the Defense channels, through our channels, and maybe has come in openly over the air and been picked up by a <sup>radio</sup> monitoring service <sup>on a world-wide basis</sup> which we have.

I, as Director of Central Intelligence, hold myself responsible for putting into that daily bulletin everything that I think is

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necessary for the policy makers to consider as of that particular moment insofar as the intelligence field is concerned. Naturally, ~~it is cumulative; I do not repeat day by day; I just put in each day the new intelligence that has come.~~ In preparing that particular bulletin I have the advice of the interested members of the Intelligence Community -- State, Army, Navy, Air collaborate in the preparation of that bulletin, provided, however, that if intelligence comes in after the normal close of business on a day, as it often seems to do, an item can be put in and so labeled as put in on an uncoordinated basis up to three or four o'clock in the morning before the bulletin is disseminated. Recently I find that everything seems to happen between two and three o'clock in the morning. But those items do get into our daily bulletin with appropriate comment. I have said to the National Security Council: "I will try to hold myself responsible for getting this information before you and you hold me responsible if an important thing has happened which could have been known and I did not report it to you." I do not believe that I have any right, after an event has occurred, on the basis of raw uncoordinated intelligence to say, "why, yes, I told you all about, say, the coup in Iraq," merely because a couple of secret intelligence items had been circulated at a low level some weeks before, which generally happens. From these uncoordinated secret reports you can generally prove anything you want afterwards, if you take enough of them and pull them together. So I have felt it is my duty to assume responsibility, if I thought those reports were worth

the attention of the high policy makers, to put them in this bulletin. But I cannot put in very much; it cannot be more than ten pages long; it has to be a bulletin that can be read in five to ten minutes. And I pretty well see that that is read, that is, read from the highest quarters down through the intelligence officers of the Government. I think it is becoming daily more effective.

Then we have for circulation, largely abroad but also here, a weekly that is on a somewhat less classified basis but which is sent abroad to our embassies and intelligence officers abroad; it is a weekly roundup of the intelligence situation.

Then, in addition, I do distribute raw intelligence as received with such ~~estimate~~ as we can put on it. That goes to the intelligence officers of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and elsewhere, as pertinent. If it happened to be an atomic energy matter, for example, it would go to the Atomic Energy Commission. I generally try to seek ~~estimates~~ evaluations from the receivers as to what they think of the intelligence so I can build up my covert sources more effectively.

Then, of course, we have many items where we make crash reports apart from any daily bulletin -- all Soviet atomic firings, all Soviet ballistic or satellite firings that we are able to anticipate, reports regarding revolutions and crises which seem to appear very frequently. In the Taiwan Strait situation recently we have been able to scoop the press by a few hours on these recent gitations they have, whether they are going to fire on odd or even days ~~or not~~ <sup>if</sup> ~~fire at all or fire for two or three weeks.~~

We have developed now the technique of getting the Chinese open radio back to this country very rapidly, so that within about fifteen minutes of its being picked up on Taiwan I have it back here in Washington. The only advantage of that is that when the newspaper people call up we do not have to say "oh, we are taken by surprise"; we can say "oh, we knew all about that" fifteen minutes ago. We don't add the "fifteen minutes ago". It is helpful to get that intelligence in as rapidly as possible.

Now just a word or two about the role of Congress in the intelligence picture.

When I first came down here we worked out a system with the Congress whereby subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees of the House and the Senate and the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate would be the monitoring committees for the Central Intelligence Agency. In most cases they were also the same committees which dealt with intelligence from the point of view of the Defense establishment.

That function of small subcommittees worked out extremely well, But we have found over the years that it has not fully satisfied the Congress for all they want to know about what is going on in the intelligence field. There seems to be a general feeling that has been expanded by sensational press reports that we are spending billions of dollars in the intelligence field, that we are employing vast armies of intelligence collectors, and that there is something there that deserves further scrutiny by the Congress. Most of these

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stories are far from the mark.

When you come to put a cost tag on intelligence -- I mean not this kind of intelligence but the kind of intelligence that we are collecting -- it is not easy to do. One might say, for example, Selden (Chapin), that practically everything the State Department is doing in the field is collecting intelligence. It is. But we do not put the cost of the entire diplomatic and consular service against intelligence, even though their major function is collecting reports and transmitting reports. In the Army, for example, the Map Service is generally put under the head of intelligence. I think in the Navy (that is not <sup>done</sup> that way).

There is no hard and fast rule as to what is intelligence and what is some other related activity. The Bureau of the Budget has been after me, as has <sup>the</sup> Congress, to try to put a cost tag on the whole intelligence effort. I have so far been able to avoid doing it because I do not think it is possible to do it or to get any agreement as to what falls into the real cost of intelligence. It is plenty, and I wish we could reduce it, but I do not see any way of reducing it with the high cost of collecting scientific intelligence and the sophistication that is needed to do it.

In any event we are going to have, I think, an increasing demand by the Congress that we do give them more information. This last year I have had to appear not only before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees many times, <sup>but I have also</sup> ~~I have also~~ had to appear before the Foreign Relations Committees and the Foreign Affairs Committees

of the Senate and the House, <sup>et al</sup> I have had to appear before the committee on space matters. I tried to tell them that my charter does not go to the moon, but I have not yet been able to persuade them that I do not have certain functions there, and I think probably we do. I think the Intelligence Community has the function of following what the Soviet Union is doing in space matters, ~~and covering that angle~~. In any event, the Congress is taking a new interest in it.

The Congress wants to know more about what is going on in the world. We have been asked to brief many committee members and committees themselves on current intelligence in the world. That is a problem in this Government we will have to face and find some way of meeting. They want to have a watch-dog committee for me and for the rest of the Intelligence Community in Congress, and that will probably be debated next year. I look at it rather philosophically. If they want a committee they will have it and if the Congress thinks it is necessary we will live with it.

In this audience I want to just devote a moment to stressing a point that I have taken up with the Department of Defense and I feel very strongly on.

I think that the intelligence functions of the military attachés should be strengthened, that there should be more military attachés in certain places, that the duties of the military attachés (I am including all the Services, of course) to cover what is happening in the military forces of the various countries should be further emphasized. Looking at the situation in Southeast Asia today, for

example, we find that their attempt -- brave but rather futile attempt -- in their state of education or lack of education to set up what we would call democracies has failed. They have had to turn back or have turned back to the one area of stability that they find in those countries at the present time, and that is the military. So we find that military men are taking over and trying to run these countries under very difficult conditions. There have been how many? We have had Iraq; we have had Burma; we have had Thailand; we have had Pakistan, the most important of all. Those are four in the course of, say, four months or less; and more coming.

I do not say that I am discouraged that this is the end of the democratic system in that part of the world. I think there has to be a growth. I do not think in any one of these cases the military men want to necessarily remain in power unless they can remain in power under democratic processes. But <sup>there</sup> is going to be a transition.

Who are the people that can get next to these new leaders in this part of the world? They are the military people. They can do it much better than we civilians can. I do not criticize the military for not having discovered the Iraq coup. Maybe I should have discovered the Iraq coup. The only way one could have told about that beforehand, when the Iraqis did not know about it, would have been <sup>460</sup> sitting right next to the commander of the 19th and 20th brigades, because they ran the show -- they and a very few other men ran that particular show. It was not easy to get intelligence on

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that.

I think that there is a growing and very important need for strengthening the military intelligence reporting on a world-wide basis. And I think that we have ~~also~~ in that situation, while not using our MAAG representatives as intelligence officers, our representatives on the various MAAGs know more closely (probably) than any other foreigner what the attitude of the military is in various countries. We have to follow that; it is going to be important. They are going to have a great influence on the trend in that part of the world; and I am trying to see that a comparable build-up in our potential to deal with that situation is carried out.

Well, I have here, I see, a little item on my agenda as to what are the pitfalls in this field of national intelligence. My first item here is: Prejudice.

As human beings we are all creatures of prejudice. We have stubborn beliefs that certain events are likely to happen, and we find it very difficult to change those beliefs. I think maybe the only way one can deal with the question of prejudice is to have a group of people as we do now have, so that we can consult together, and it is not likely that everybody is going to be prejudiced in the same direction; you are going to get a somewhat balanced view of the situation. I think, though, if you look over the mistakes in history, some of which I have mentioned, you will find it was a stubborn prejudice which was the greatest cause of error right through.

Then the second pitfall is the danger that we will warp our

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intelligence to support a policy or to please one's superiors. It is not easy to take in reports the effect of which is to tell the policy maker that he is all wrong, that he is going on the wrong track. But we have to be strong enough to do that if we think the facts and the evidence all point that way. Certainly in the days of Hitler that was one of the problems; they did not dare go to Hitler with unfavorable reports. I think that the Russians have suffered under that a good deal. I doubt very much if the Russian Foreign Service has really got the guts to tell Khrushchev where he is wrong. Certainly in a democracy such as we have, where we might lose our jobs, although not very likely, we certainly are not going to lose our heads if we tell our superiors that the facts seem to point in a different

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direction. The way policy at the moment seems to be going I think that it is our duty in the intelligence field. *to tell the facts as we see them*

I think a third failure is the failure to pay enough attention to details, small signs that we disregard. Maybe a better way to put it is the proper weighing of the elements in a given situation.

I think also another failure that maybe we are being cured of now is the failure to be alert to the likelihood of change and its effects. I don't know that at one time we gave enough attention, for example, to the consequences at the end of the colonial era. We knew in our heart of hearts it was there, it was going, but we did not properly interpret the effect of the speed of this movement and the consequences in many fields.

Well, my time is up and more than up. I want to thank you

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for your patience and to tell you that I think that by and large we are getting together a coordinated Intelligence Community. I think in the last ten years we have made real progress.

I want to pay a tribute to the very great contribution that is made by the military Services and by the State Department, because without this community effort on a coordinated basis we would not certainly be able to achieve either the standing I think we have now achieved in the field of policy or the real competence that I think we are now slowly attaining.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
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Executive Registry

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PROGRAM OF LECTURES  
COURSE FOUR  
"STRATEGY AND WARFARE"  
5 November - 11 December 1958

Herewith is a list of titles of lectures to be presented during Course Four, "Strategy and Warfare." The purpose of this announcement is to advise the various agencies of the Government of those lectures which are pertinent to them and to acquaint these agencies with the regulations governing attendance. Each agency must inform its representatives attending a National War College lecture of the contents herein and assure itself that its representative yields obeisance to these restrictions.

NWC guest lecturers are assured that their remarks will be held in the strictest confidence, and will not be attributed to them either directly, or through insinuation outside the college lecture hall. Each agency is enjoined to assure itself that its representatives respect the "Off the Record" basis of the lecture program.

Attendance at all lectures requires a Top Secret clearance. Visitors are not authorized to take notes or make a verbatim transcript of the lecture.

Visitors may not question the speaker during the question period following the lecture.

Due to the very limited seating available for visitors, it is desired that the agency requesting admission do so on a "Need to Know Basis."

Requests for attendance will be made in writing, to arrive at the Operations Office of the college no later than one week prior to the lecture. Suitable clearance documentation must accompany all requests. Since this office will be unable to advise visitors of last minute cancellations of any lectures, it is suggested they call EXecutive 3-7700, extension 336, on the day before the scheduled lecture.

Visitors should be in grade of Colonel or Captain or GS-14 and above.

ALL VISITORS MUST BE PRESENT IN THE AUDITORIUM FIVE MINUTES PRIOR TO THE STARTING OF THE LECTURE. VISITORS WILL NOT BE ADMITTED AFTER THE LECTURE HAS COMMENCED.

JOHN W. KEATING  
Colonel, Infantry  
Executive Officer

0900 THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ON MILITARY POWER.  
Dr. Edward Teller, Professor of Physics, University of California,  
and Associate Director, University of California Radiation  
Laboratory.

21 November

0900 THE IMPACT OF GUIDED MISSILES ON NATIONAL STRATEGY.  
(Panel presentation) Rear Admiral K. S. Masterson, USN,  
Director, Guided Missiles Division, Office of Chief of Naval  
Operations.

24 November

0900 ADDRESS. (Subject of own choosing) General Nathan F. Twining,  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint NWC-ICAF Lecture)

25 November

0900 CURRENT UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY. The  
Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State. (Joint NWC-ICAF  
Lecture)

26 November

0900 ALTERNATE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND POLICIES FOR THE  
U. S. Mr. George F. Kennan, The Institute for Advanced Study,  
Princeton University.

2 December

0900 POLITICAL WARFARE AND PROPAGANDA. Mr. James Burnham,  
Author, Lecturer and Editor, National Review.

3 December

0900 ECONOMIC WARFARE. Professor G. Warren Nutter, James  
Wilson Department of Economics, University of Virginia.

0900 REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS. The Honorable James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations (Deputy Chief of Mission).

9 December

0900 CBR WARFARE. Major General Marshall Stubbs, USA, Chief Chemical Officer, Department of the Army.